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Abstract
In this paper, Knowledge-Capital model estimates for a small country are
compared to estimates obtained for larger economies. The model is based
on unique panel data on foreign direct investment in Iceland. Estimates
obtained for the Knowledge-Capital model diﬀer considerable from what has
been obtained in earlier research, indicating that the driving forces behind
foreign direct investment in small countries appear to be diﬀerent from those
in large countries.
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With increased data availability, empirical research on foreign direct investment
(FDI) has grown as well. Among the approaches used by researches, the knowledge
capital model presented by Carr, Markusen and Maskus(CMM, 2001) has moved to
the forefront. The main advantage of this framework is that it is based on the theory
of the multinational enterprise as discussed by Markusen (2002). In particular, this
speciﬁcation adds information on endowments of skilled labor to the traditional set
of explanatory variables such as country size and trade costs. I apply the CMM
speciﬁcation to a unique panel of Icelandic FDI data and ﬁnd estimates to diﬀer
considerably from those found by CMM and other researchers. In particular, my
results for the skill labor measures run contrary to earlier ﬁndings. These results
may be due to diﬀerences between the large country data used by other researchers,
or that the CMM speciﬁcation encounters data diﬃculties when the there is a lot
of diﬀerence in source and host country gross domestic products.
Multinational enterprises are ﬁrms that engage in activities transnationally, ei-
ther by establishing subsidiaries or directly investing in foreign ﬁrms. The func-
tionality of directly investing in foreign ﬁrms has been referred to as foreign direct
investment in those cases where MNEs have a controlling stock in ﬁrms. Normally,
a controlling stock refers to the interest in acquiring a lasting management interest
ownership of 10% or more in a ﬁrm. This type of international capital investment
has often been referred to as greenﬁeld investment, or mergers and acquisitions.
In this paper, the issue of concern is FDI stock in Iceland. This is measured as
gross FDI and is equal to the total amount of FDI coming into Iceland, without
subtracting outward FDI.
The general belief is that the ﬂow of foreign direct investment is primarily from
North to South, in other words, from the industrialized countries of the ‘North’ to
the less developed world in the ‘South’. This is however not the case since most
of FDI takes place between the more developed countries and therefore the ﬂow of
FDI is primarily between the East and West, rather than from North to South. In
11999, the developed countries accounted for 74% of world FDI inﬂows and 91% of
outﬂows, whereas the developing countries accounted for 24% of world inﬂows and
8% of outﬂows. The Central and the Eastern European countries accounted for
only 1% of world FDI inﬂows (Markusen, 2002, pp. 9).
Figure 1 shows the development of two ratios in Iceland: the FDI/GDP ratio
and skilled labor as a ratio of total labor supply. More speciﬁcally, the skilled
labor is measured as “professional, technical, kindred, and administrative workers”
classiﬁed as the sum of occupational categories 0/1 and 2 by the International Labor
Organization (ILO). The relationship between the two ratios appears to be inverse,
however the observations for skilled labor supply on the right side axis only vary
over a narrow range. Since skilled labor is a key variable in other FDI studies, one
of the main objectives of this paper is to analyze the relationship between skilled
labor and FDI in Iceland. This will be done in order to determine how FDI is
aﬀected by skilled labor in small countries like Iceland, relative to other countries.



















FDI/GDP (left axis) Skilled Labor/Total Labor Supply (right axis)
Source: World Bank, Central Bank of Iceland and the ILO.
2Foreign direct investment is said to be horizontal when multinationals operate
analogous corporate activities in diﬀerent countries. A typical example of that
would be a company like McDonald’s. Generally, horizontal FDI is likely to take
place between the developed countries of similar size and relative endowments.
FDI is said to be vertical when multinationals place corporate facilities in diﬀerent
countries; this is often done to exploit diﬀerences in factor prices by gaining access
to cheap raw materials.
The literature on multinational enterprises and foreign direct investment is rela-
tively recent. The models on horizontal FDI by Markusen (1984) and vertical FDI
by Helpman (1984) have been widely used when explaining FDI. In a paper com-
bining the main features of the vertical and horizontal models, Markusen, Venables,
Konan, and Zhang (1996) laid the basis for the Knowledge-Capital (KK) model.
T h eK Km o d e ld r a w si t sn a m ef r o mt h ef a c tt h a ti n t a n g i b l ea s s e t ss u c ha sh u m a n
capital are sometimes referred to as knowledge-capital. One of the main features
of the KK model is that it explains how investment decisions of multinationals are
aﬀected by the diﬀerence of skilled-labor in the source and host country. Further
research by Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (CMM, 2001) presented an empirical spec-
iﬁcation of the model, hereafter referred to as the CMM speciﬁcation. CMM (2001)
tested their econometric speciﬁcation on a sample representing bilateral activities
of US multinationals in a range of countries. However, the KK model has not yet
been tested for small economies such as Iceland. Iceland is not only an interesting
case because of its small size and how distant it is from other countries, but also
because it is generally believed to be relatively skilled-labor abundant.
CMM (2001) observe FDI to be strictly increasing in the skill diﬀerences between
the source and the host country. However, more recent estimates obtained by
Blonigen, Davies, and Head (2002) indicate that FDI is increasing in negative skill
diﬀerences, but decreasing in positive skill diﬀerences. Blonigen et al. estimates
indicate that a relative increase in source skillness compared to host will increase
FDI in cases when source is more skilled than host, but decrease FDI in cases
when host is more skilled than source. They therefore conclude that the Markusen
3(1984) model on horizontal MNEs cannot be rejected in favor of the KK model. In a
more recent paper, Davies (2002) estimation results indicate that FDI is increasing
in negative skill diﬀerences, decreasing in slightly positive skill diﬀerences, and
increasing again as skill diﬀerences become more highly positive. According to
the Davies (2002) speciﬁcation, the KK model cannot be rejected in favor of the
horizontal model. Finally, Braconier, Norbäck, and Urban (2003) report that they
ﬁnd support for the KK model, basing their estimates on a much richer database
on factor prices than used in comparable studies. They conclude that in previous
studies, the mapping from theory to empirics has suﬀered from a poor data coverage.
Figure 2 exhibits an Edgeworth Box based on the theory behind the Knowledge-
Capital model. The idea behind this box is to relate the countries’ size to their
relative endowments. Being a small host country, Iceland is expected to be posi-
tioned in the northeast corner of the Edgeworth Box. In the northeast corner, the
diﬀerence between the source and the host countries GDPs is positive given that
the host country is much smaller than the source country.
4Figure 2: World Edgeworth Box
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Moreover, since Iceland is generally believed to be well endowed with skilled
labor, it is presumed to be in the northeast corner on the SW-NE diagonal in the
Edgeworth Box. This is due to the fact that on the east side of the diagonal, the
host country is better endowed with skilled labor relative to the source country.
However, actual data on job categories indicate that Iceland is not necessarily more
skill abundant relative to the source countries. Therefore, Iceland appears to
be located farther to the northeast than host countries used in empirical studies
generally are, and on both sides of the SW-NE diagonal. The location of Iceland
as a host country is better exhibited in Figures 3 and 4 in Appendix A.
This paper is based on unilateral data of inward FDI stock in Iceland. The
approach to the use of unilateral data on FDI is somewhat similar to a paper by
Markusen and Maskus (1999) on outward FDI. Another analogous example would
5be Brainard (1997), in which she estimated separately inward and outward FDI
proxies by shares of total foreign sales. The data in this paper cover foreign direct
investment in Iceland from 1989 to 1999. The data are unique in that they have not
been used before, and so is the approach in the sense that it has never before been
applied to such a small country. Therefore, it is of particular interest to analyze
how the CMM speciﬁcation of the KK model applies to Iceland, and to consider the
theoretical intuition behind the results. Several variations of the CMM speciﬁcation
are also estimated, including the Davies (2002) speciﬁcation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes a literature review and
the model speciﬁcation. Data are presented in Section 3. Section 4 provides
estimation results for some speciﬁcation restrictions. Section 5 gives an overview
of the impacts from removing large outliers from the sample. Section 6 shows the
results from increasing the number of observations, whereas Section 7 examines the
eﬀects of changing the skilled-labor abundance proxy. In Section 8, the results
from applying the Davies (2002) empirical speciﬁcation are reported. Finally,
conclusions are presented in Section 9.
62 The KK Model
2.1 Related Literature
In the beginning of the 1980s, the so-called “New Trade Theory” was added to the
conventional international economic literature. Models of the New Trade Theory
incorporate imperfect competition, increasing returns to scale, and product diﬀer-
entiation in both general and partial equilibrium models of trade (CMM, 2001,
pp.693). An important contribution to the literature was made by Paul Krug-
man in 1979. Later, the literature on Economic Geography developed, beginning
again with Krugman (1991) explaining industry agglomeration within regions and
countries.
There has been a growing literature on foreign direct investment made by multi-
national enterprises. Until recently, foreign direct investment has mainly been in-
corporated into two general-equilibrium models. These are the model on vertical
FDI presented by Helpman (1984) and the model on horizontal FDI by Markusen
(1984). FDI is said to be vertical when MNEs choose to facilitate their operations
in diﬀerent geographic locations depending on the stage of production. However,
horizontal FDI takes place when MNEs locate analogous activities in diﬀerent coun-
tries1. In Helpman’s (1984) model, the incentive for vertical FDI is the diﬀerence
in relative factor endowments. On the other hand, Markusen (1984) assumes that
FDI is dominated by horizontal MNEs when countries are similar in size as well as
in relative endowments, and trade costs are moderate to high2. The main features
of the horizontal and vertical models are combined in the Knowledge-Capital (KK)
model of the multinational in the paper by Markusen, Venables, Konan, and Zhang
(1996). In addition, an econometric speciﬁcation of the KK model was introduced
by Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (CMM, 2001). Diﬀerent empirical speciﬁcations
of the KK model have been developed by Bloningen, Davies, and Head (BDH, 2002)
1More related literature on multinational ﬁrms can be found in Markusen (2002).
2Aggregate data has shown the developed countries to be the main source as well the main
recipient countries of foreign direct investment (Markusen, 2002).
7as well as Davies (2002).
By using an empirical speciﬁcation slightly diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h a to fC M Ma n d
running regressions on subsamples of the data, BDH ﬁnd evidence for a decrease in
FDI when skill diﬀerences are positive and increasing. Therefore, BDH conclude
that the horizontal model by Markusen (1984) cannot be rejected in favor of the
KK model3. An alternative empirical speciﬁcation of the KK model is put forward
by Davies (2002)4. The speciﬁcation applied by Davies ﬁnds FDI not to be strictly
decreasing in positive skill diﬀerences, but that the relationship is non-monotonic.
Davies therefore ﬁnds evidence supporting the KK model. Finally, Braconier,
Norbäck, and Urban (BNU, 2003) test the CMM speciﬁcation with a much richer
dataset than has been used in earlier research. The results they observe from using
the CMM speciﬁcation are found to yield results much like the simulations in the
CMM paper. BNU therefore conclude that strong support is found for the KK
model. More speciﬁcally, by using data on factor prices instead of endowments,
they ﬁnd support for the CMM speciﬁcation of the KK model. The ﬁndings
obtained earlier give a motivation to analyze how the CMM speciﬁcation of the KK
model predicts for small countries.
3Estimates obtained for the horizontal model indicate that FDI is decreasing in positive skill
diﬀerences.
4In his paper, Davies (2002) ﬁnds that while horizontal FDI is decreasing in positive skill
diﬀerences, vertical FDI is increasing.
82.2 Theoretical Framework of the KK Model
The idea behind the CMM (2001) paper on the KK model is to translate trade
theories into simulations5 r e l a t i n gf o r e i g nd i r e c ti n v e s t m e n tt oe c o n o m i cs i z ea n d
relative endowments. The paper is referred to by authors as the knowledge-capital
model of the multinational enterprise. In the paper the authors apply industrial
organization approach to international trade allowing for determination of how in-
dustry characteristics interact with country characteristics.
The knowledge-capital model speciﬁcation estimated here is primarily based on
three assumptions6.T h e ﬁr s ta s s u m p t i o ni m p l i e st h a ti ti sp o s s i b l et og e o g r a p h -
ically separate services referred to as knowledge-based and knowledge-generating
activities from production. These would be services like research and development.
Moreover, this ﬁrst assumption implies that it is cheap to supply these services
to production facilities. The second assumption is that knowledge-demanding ac-
tivities require relatively a lot of skilled labor. Together, the ﬁrst and second
assumption allow7 for vertical activities, implying that R&D are located where
skilled labor is available at low cost, but production location favored close to cheap
unskilled labor. Production is also drawn to locations where ﬁrms can exploit
economies of scale in production plants. The third main assumption implies that
t h et y p eo fs e r v i c e sd e ﬁn e di nt h eﬁrst assumption can be used simultaneously in
various locations. The third assumption allows for scale economies at ﬁrm level
and gives an incentive for horizontal multinational activity, implying production in
diﬀerent geographical locations.
T h em o d e li sb a s e do naw o r l dw i t ht w oc o u n t r i e s ,t w of a c t o r sa n dt w og o o d s .
The countries are here referred to as source and host8. The two factors are in-
ternationally immobile factors, skilled and unskilled labor. The two goods in the
5The numerical simulation procedure applied in the CMM (2001) paper is better demonstrated
in Markusen et al. (1996) and Markusen (1997).
6See more on the KK model in (CMM, 2001, pp. 694) and in (CMM, 2003).
7”allow” rather than ”induce” is used for ”create a motive for”...
8The countries are either referred to as source and host or as home and foreign, the latter
labelling is applied in the CMM (2001) paper.
9model are labelled x and y, and are diﬀerent in nature. The characteristics of good
x are such that x is skilled-labor intensive and enjoys increasing returns to scale
(IRS) under the conditions of Cournot competition, with the possibility of having
individual plants geographically separated from headquarters. However, the second
good y, is subject to constant returns to scale (CRS) and is labor-intensive.
In this model structure there are six ﬁrm types and the model allows for free
entry and exit in and out of ﬁrm types. Firms are either horizontal, vertical or
national. The horizontal multinationals Hh (Hf)a r eﬁrms producing in the source
and host country, with headquarters in the source country. The national ﬁrms Nh
(Nf), are ﬁrms with headquarters and production in the source (host) country only,
which may export to the other country. Vertical multinationals Vh (Vf), are those
with single plant in the host and headquarters in the source country, with export
possible to the source country.
The assumptions presented in the knowledge-capital model drawn from Markusen
and Venables (1986) paper and Markusen (1987) are that horizontal multinationals
Hh will be dominant in the source country if source and host are similarly endowed
and similar in size, and trade costs are moderate or high. However, vertical multi-
nationals Vh will be dominant in the source country in cases when source is small,
relatively skilled labor abundant and trade costs are not extreme. Finally, national
ﬁrms Nh will be dominant under conditions where source is large and skilled labor
abundant, source and host are of similar size and similarly endowed and trade costs
are low, or in cases where barriers to foreign direct investment are high in the host
country.
The simulation results obtained for the KK model allow for development of
predictions about volume of production of various ﬁrm types. In the empirical
regressions estimated in the following sections, the two countries are labelled as
source and host, referring to the citizenship of a particular multinational.
102.3 The Basic Empirical Speciﬁcation Applied
The KK model is primarily based on the assumptions of Economic Geography,
since the model balances closeness to consumer markets with market size to achieve
economies of scale (Krugman, 1983; Horstman and Markusen, 1992; Brainard,
1993). In the model, closeness to consumers is proxied by distance, and mar-
ket size is proxied by GDP. The KK model is also based on the foundations of
the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem9 by applying the factor proportions hypothesis when
using skill diﬀerences as a proxy for diﬀerences in relative factor endowments.
Fdiij,t = β0 + β1Ysumij,t + β2Ydiff
2
ij,t + β3Sdiffij,t
+β4Ydiffij,t∗Sdiffij,t + β5Invcj,t + β6Tcj,t (1)
+β7Tcj,t∗Sdiff
2
ij,t + β8Tci,t + β9Disij + εij,t
The basic model speciﬁcation estimated in this paper is introduced in Equation
(1). In the equation above, the following relationship holds: E[εi,t | xi,t]=0which
means that the error term (εi,t)i si n d e p e n d e n to ft h ee x p l a n a t o r yv a r i a b l e s( xij,t).
A more careful description of the variables in the model is provided in Table 1
below.
In this paper, a Tobit procedure is also used, and here this procedure implies a
threshold with a lower limit of zero, so that10
FDI
TOBIT
ij.t = FDIij.t if FDIij.t > 0 (2)
FDI
TOBIT
ij.t =0if FDIij.t ≤ 0
The dependent variable FDIij,t is deﬁned as foreign direct investment going from
country (i) to country (j) at time (t). More speciﬁcally, FDI is measured as stock of
9The proposition of the Heckscher-Ohlin Model implies that countries will export goods that
use relatively intensively their relatively abundant factors.
10James Tobin (1959).
11investment11. This variable measures the FDI made in the host country by various
source countries over time. The subscript (i) denotes the source country, running
from 1 to 23, the subscript (j) refers to the host country Iceland, and time is denoted
by (t). The ﬁrst two explanatory variables, Ysumij,t and Ydiff2
ij,t are inserted to
represent economic size and size diﬀerences. The ﬁrst variable, Ysumij,t,a c c o u n t s
for the joint market size of host and source countries, proxied by the sum of the
countries’ GDP. Here Ysumij,t is used to represent the aggregate economic size of
the source and host country, since investment is expected to increase with the size
of the host and source countries. More FDI is expected to take place between large
economies, and therefore the variable coeﬃcient is expected to have a positive sign.
The second explanatory variable, Ydiff2
ij,t is deﬁned as the GDP of the source
country minus the GDP of the host country, squared. The squared economic size
diﬀerence is used here rather than plain diﬀerence to reﬂect the absolute diﬀerence in
the size of the countries. Fdiij,t is expected to decrease with an increase in squared
size diﬀerences, and therefore the Ydiff2
ij,t coeﬃcient is expected to be negative.
This is true because FDI is expected to be increasingly trending downward as a
function of Ydiffij,t. More speciﬁcally, the Ydiff2
ij,t term is symmetric around
zero. From there it follows that Fdiij,t is biggest around the zero point, but
decreases on either side of zero. This term is included to capture horizontal FDI,
since horizontal FDI is believed to decrease as the source and host country become
dissimilar in size.
The Sdiffij,t variable is included in the model speciﬁcation to capture diﬀerences
in skilled labor endowments between the source and host country. Fdiij,t is expected
to increase as skill diﬀerences increase, that is when t h es o u r c ec o u n t r yb e c o m e s
more skilled than the host country. Therefore the Sdiffij,t variable is expected to
have a positive sign. Horizontal investment is expected to be the greatest between
equally skilled countries; that is, when skill diﬀerences between the source and the
host country are zero.
11The Central Bank of Iceland deﬁnes foreign direct investment (FDI) as solely investment in
business activities, not including investment in real estate.





Foreign direct investment made by the source country
(i) in the host country (j), over time (t).
Ysumij,t
The sum of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of
the source country (i) and the GDP of the host coun-




T h eG D Po ft h es o u r c ec o u n t r y( i )m i n u st h eG D P
of the host country (j), squared over time (t). —
Sdiffij,t
Skilled labor in the source country (i) minus skilled
labor in the host country (j), over time (t). +
Ydiffij,t∗Sdiffij,t
Interation term, capturing the interaction between
the GDP diﬀerence of the source and host countries
and the skill diﬀerence variable, over time (t).
—
Invcj,t
The investment cost foreign investors are faced with
when investing in the host country (j), over time (t). —
Tcj,t Trade costs in the host country (j), over time (t). +
Tcj,t∗Sdiff2
ij,t
Interaction term, capturing interaction between trade
costs in the host country and squared skill diﬀerences,
over time (t).
+
Tci,t Trade cost in the source country (i), over time (t). —
Disij
Geographical distance between the source country (i)
and the host country (j). —
The interaction term Ydiffij,t∗Sdiffij,t is included in the model to account
for interaction between Ydiffij,t and the diﬀerences in skilled labor endowments,
Sdiffij,t. The interaction term is intended to reﬂect how much skill diﬀerences
Sdiffij,t matter, depending on where countries are located in the Edgeworth box.
In other words, the idea is that the interaction term captures the importance of
diﬀerences in the level of skilled labor in the source and host country, depending
on how much they diﬀer in size. Skill diﬀerences between similarly sized countries
are not expected to weigh as much as those between dissimilarly sized countries.
Therefore, FDI is expected to decrease with an increase in Ydiffij,t, yielding a
negative expected coeﬃcient.
The variable Invcj,t capturing investment costs, is used as a proxy for investment
barriers facing investors entering the host country. The Invcj,t variable is an index
calculated from a range of other indices. The investment cost index runs from zero
13to 100 with higher numbers indicating higher investment costs. An increase in the
investment costs variable in the host country is expected to reduce inward FDI and
therefore the investment cost has a negative predicted coeﬃcient.
The two indices for trade costs are intended to reﬂect the protectionist stance of
each country’s trade policy. More speciﬁcally, trade costs are deﬁned as national
protectionism accounting for whether foreign products and services are prevented
from being imported. Therefore, as the value of the variable representing trade
costs Tcj,t increases, the host country (Iceland) is more prone to prevent foreign
products and services from being imported. This also applies to the trade costs
index calculated for source countries, the Tci,t index. Higher trade barriers in
the host country are expected to aid Fdiij,t, since MNEs in the source countries
have more incentives to invest in, rather than export to, a host country with high
trade barriers. Higher trade barriers in the source country, Tci,t, are expected to
reduce FDI. This is because higher trade barriers in the source country are believed
to reduce the source country’s incentives to invest in the host country in order to
export back home. Therefore, the coeﬃcient of the latter trade variable is expected
to be negative.
Moreover, the interaction between trade and skill diﬀerences is captured by an
interaction term, Tcj,t∗Sdiff2
ij,t, which is expected to have a positive coeﬃcient
sign. The coeﬃcient sign is expected to be positive since it represents the eﬀects
of skill diﬀerences changes on the marginal eﬀect of host trade costs on FDI. As
mentioned before, FDI is expected to increase with an increase in trade cost in the
h o s t ,s i n c et h eM N E sh a v em o r ei n c e n t i v et oi n v e s ti nt h eh o s tr a t h e rt h a ne x p o r tt o
the host. The interaction term indicates that the squared skill term magniﬁes the
eﬀects of the host’s trade cost, which increase its marginal eﬀects. Furthermore, a
geographical distance variable, denoted as Disij, is included to reﬂect proximity to
customers. The distance variable is expected to have a negative coeﬃcient. The
use of distance as a proxy for transport costs is well established in the gravity model
by Bergstrand (1985).
143D a t a
The data used in this paper cover overall foreign direct investment (FDI) in Iceland
over the 1989-1999 period. The following countries are the source countries of
foreign direct investment: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark,
Faeroe Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Israel, Japan, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Latvia, Luxembourg, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom and the United States. The data on FDI are obtained
from the Central Bank of Iceland.
Foreign direct investment, Fdiij,t, is measured as inward FDI, in millions of
US dollars at 1995 prices. Here the accumulated stock of FDI is used rather than
ﬂows, since FDI stocks are generally believed to carry information about investment
incentives from the past to the present, i.e. accumulated changes in investment up
to the current year. In their paper, CMM use aﬃliate sales. However, FDI
stock is used here since it is believed to better reﬂect long-term strategies of MNEs.
Similar to FDI ﬂows, aﬃliate sales are subject to short-term, rather than long-term
objectives of MNEs operations. Advantages of using FDI stock, rather than aﬃliate
sales, are well explained in a paper by Davies (2002).
The FDI stock data used are obtained in millions of Icelandic Kronur and con-
verted to US dollars using the World Bank dollar exchange rate, and then put on a
1995 level by a World Bank GDP deﬂator. Thus, the FDI values become compa-
rable to the variable values on the right-hand side of the model, since the host and
the source country GDP values are obtained in 1995 US dollars.
Data for the ﬁrst two explanatory variables, Ysumij,t and Ydiff2
ij,t, are based on
the host and source countries’ GDP, taken from the World Bank data base12. These
GDP data are obtained from the World Bank in constant 1995 USD values, but the
variables are presented in trillions13 of USD. Data on GDP in Germany in 1989
12With the exception of data on GDP in the Faeroe Islands being obtained from the National
Economic Institute of Faeroe Islands (Hagstova Føroya). The GDP data is obtained in Danish
kronur and then converted into 1995 US dollars, using IMF exchange rate and a World Bank GDP
deﬂator.
13Trillion is deﬁned as a million million.
15and 1990 are not included here because these are the years before the uniﬁcation of
Germany.
The data used for the skilled labor endowments, Sdiffij,t, are identical to those
used by CMM14. These data are obtained from the International Labor Organi-
zation (ILO)15 as the sum of occupational categories 0/1 and 2; where category
0/1 accounts for professional, technical, and kindred workers, and category 2 for
administrative workers. Moreover, the skilled labor ratio is calculated as the sum
of categories 0/1 and 2, divided by the sum of all occupational categories. The
skilled labor ratio is used as a proxy for relative skilled labor abundance. The ILO
data on skilled-labor in Iceland are available for the nine-year period, 1991-1999.
The indices for trade and investment costs and calculated in the same way as
in the CMM paper16. The data used for the Invcj,t index here are also analogous
to the data used in the CMM paper17. The index for investment costs is calcu-
lated using the following indices: restrictions on the ability to acquire control in a
domestic company, limitations on the ability to employ skilled labor, restraints on
negotiating joint ventures, strict controls on hiring and ﬁring practices, the absence
of a fair administration of justice, diﬃculties in acquiring local bank credit, restric-
tions on access to local and foreign capital markets, and inadequate protection of
intellectual property. The resulting investment index runs on a scale from zero
to 100, with a higher number indicating higher investment costs. The trade costs
variable of the host country is presented as Tcj,t, while the source country trade
14I greatly appreciate that David Carr and Keith Maskus provided me with the data used in
the (CMM, 2001) paper on the KK model.
15As in the case of CMM, data on skilled labor are taken from the ILO, Yearbook of Labor
Statistics.
16The data on investment are obtained from a survey made by the World Competitiveness
Report (WCR) on internationalization of countries. The values used are obtained by subtracting
the original values in the report from 10 and then multiplying them by 100. This is done to
make the values consistent with the investment cost index, with higher values representing higher
barriers. As mentioned earlier, the investment cost is composed of a simple average of 9 individual
indices. The simple average is then multiplied by 10 and subtracted from 100 as in the case of
the trade cost index. Both of the cost indices run from 0 to 100, with 100 the highest possible
barrier.
17The only exception is that the index accounting for ”market dominance” is not included in
the investment index due to lack of data.
16costs are represented as Tci,t.
As Table 2 shows, the number of observations for the investment cost Invcj,t
and the trade cost Tcj,t in the host country are limited to 115, since the data are
only available from the World Competitiveness Report from the period 1995 - 1999.
However, for most of the source countries trade cost data are obtainable for a longer
period.
Table 2. Summary Statistics for the Basic Sample
Variable Units Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Fdiij,t Million USD 253 9.39 24.82 -0.33 159.52
Ysumij,t Trillion USD 240 0.97 1.78 0.01 8.59
Ydiffij,t Trillion USD 240 0.96 1.78 -0.008 8.57
Ydiff2
ij,t Trillion USD 240 4.09 12.32 7.43e-7 73.51
Sdiffij,t Index [-1,1] 155 0.03 0.06 -0.08 0.14
Sdiff2
ij,t 155 0.004 0.005 9.57e-10 0.02
Ydiffij,t∗Sdiffij,t 155 0.04 0.21 -0.27 1.11
Invcj,t Index [0,100] 115 33.01 1.92 29.92 35.28
Tcj,t Index [0,100] 115 48.18 3.81 43.70 52.50
Tcj,t∗Sdiff2
ij,t 83 0.16 0.23 2.0e-5 0.85
Tci,t Index [0,100] 215 28.61 11.66 5.30 64.80
Disij Kilometers 253 3,899 3,600 450 16,609
Sources: World Bank, IMF, ILO, World Competitiveness Report, Central Bank of
Iceland, National Economic Institute of Faeroe Islands, Distance Calculator, David
Carr and Keith Maskus.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the basic sample. As shown, the depen-
dent variable Fdiij,t is measured in millions of USD, rather than trillions of USD,
like the Ysumij,t and Ydiff2
ij,t variables. This was done since the amount of FDI
is considerably lower than the economic size of the source countries. What is also
noteworthy in Table 2 is that Fdiij,t has a negative minimum value of USD -0.33
million, which represents the FDI made by France in Iceland in 1989. A total of
ﬁve observations were found to be negative18, but FDI stock can become negative if
18I nt h ec a s eo fF r a n c ea n dt h eF a e r o eI s l a n d s .
17FDI ﬂows become negative within that year. This might be the case if, for example,
a dividend payment from the host country to the source country is higher than the
investments made in a particular year.
As can be seen in Table 2, the number of observations is highest for FDI, with
a total of 253 observations. The data provide full information on FDI, and the
data are almost balanced for other variables. As explained earlier, the investment
and trade cost samples are the most limited in size, including data running over ﬁve
years from 1995 to 1999. As a result, the number of observations for the interaction
term, Tcj,t∗Sdiff2
ij,t is low, i.e. a total of 83 observations. The reason for the low
number of observations for the interaction term is because the Tcj,t and Sdiff2
ij,t
variables do not overlap in all years. Furthermore, there is a balanced database on
distance. Distance, Disij, is measured in kilometers19 between the capitals of the
host and the source countries. FDI is expected to decrease as the source countries
become more distant and the coeﬃcient sign is therefore expected to be negative.
Finally, the new skill proxy in Section 9, measuring education, or ”School en-
rollment, secondary (% gross)” is obtained from the World Bank indicators.
The regressions presented in following sections are estimated by the OLS or
the Tobit estimators (Greene, 1997), and all regressions are obtained using STATA
version 7.0.
19The data on distance were obtained from the Distance Calculator (2000).
184 Estimation Results
4.1 The Econometric Speciﬁcation Estimated
The basic CMM empirical speciﬁcation is ﬁrst estimated with two diﬀerent es-
timation procedures, OLS and Tobit. The main diﬀerences between these two
procedures is that Tobit accumulates all negative observations around zero20, while
OLS includes all observations regardless of their value. More speciﬁcally, Tobit is
a censoring procedure that allows us to set upper and lower limits on the regression
data. Here the lower limit is zero. Therefore, the Tobit procedure can be regarded
to act as a robustness check for OLS.
The OLS regression results for the KK model are shown in Table 3 along with
Tobit estimates21. Although the coeﬃcients vary in size, the estimates obtained are
analogous for both regressions, having coeﬃcients with the same signs. However,
as shown in Table 3, most of the time the signs for both regressions are opposite of
what is predicted by the CMM empirical speciﬁcation. Even though the coeﬃcient
signs often diﬀer from what is expected by CMM, it appears the results are in
line with what could be expected for a small country like Iceland. That is, it
should not be surprising that the CMM empirical speciﬁcation predicts diﬀerently
for small countries than larger ones. Being a small host country, Iceland is likely
to be positioned in the northeast corner when considering the Edgeworth Box in
Section One, Figure 2.22
20Thus, values lower than zero are set as zero and used as such for the regression estimates.
21For the Tobit estimates to be consistent, the error terms need to be normally distibuted.
However, even if the Tobit estimates do not provide as reliable results as the OLS estimates, they
tell the same story since the coeﬃcients are analogous in signs and magnitude.
22The Figure 2 surface chart in the (CMM, 2001) paper gives a clearer indication of the landscape
with which a small host country is faced, being in the northeast corner of the box.
19Table 3. The Basic CMM Speciﬁcation
Regressors OLS




























































Total Obs. 78 78





Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below the coeﬃcients. ***, ** and *
denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The ﬁrst two variables have coeﬃcient signs opposite to what is predicted by
the CMM empirical speciﬁcation of the KK model. The interpretation of countries’
interactions in the Edgeworth Box24 is that as countries i and j become dissimilar
23It is not possible to calculate R squared for a non-linear model like the Tobit model, because R
squared is designed for linear models. Therefore the so-called ”Pseudo R squared ” is calculated
for the Tobit model. Pseudo R squared indicates how the model ﬁts the data, but is not an R
squared in the general sense.
24For example, see Figure 1 and Figure 2 in the CMM paper.
20in size, Fdiij,t decreases. This happens as we move towards either the SW or the
N Ec o r n e ro ft h eb o x . I no u rc a s e ,i tc a nb et h o u g h to fa si fw ea r em o v i n gt o w a r d s
the NE corner over time. This occurs when the sum of GDPs (Ysumij,t) increases,
which occurs mainly due to an increase in the GDP size of the source country (i).25
As the source country becomes increasingly larger than the host, it corresponds to
a movement along the diagonal towards the NE corner.
This needs not to be surprising, since along with an increase in the country size
diﬀerences, we can expect overall FDI to decrease.26 This is also in line with the
coeﬃcient of the Ysumij,t variable being negative, whereas it was expected to be
positive in the CMM paper.
A similar story holds for the second variable in the KK model, Ydiff2
ij,t,w h i c h
captures squared GDP diﬀerences. However, this variable estimates simultaneous
m o v e m e n t st oe i t h e rt h eS Wo rt h eN Ec o r n e r ,s i n c ei ti ss q u a r e d . H e r ei ta p p e a r s
that within the Edgeworth box, the movement towards the SW corner outweighs
the movement towards the NE corner, resulting in a positive coeﬃcient.
T h ev a r i a b l em e a s u r i n gs k i l ld i ﬀerences, Sdiffij,t, is estimated to have a positive
coeﬃcient. This was also predicted by the CMM emprical speciﬁcation of the KK
model. This is logical, since we expect FDI to increase as we move towards the SW
corner of the Edgeworth Box.27 The Sdiffij,t coeﬃcient sign obtained in Table 3
is positive but far from being signiﬁcant. Therefore we do not ﬁnd clear evidence
for the CMM empirical speciﬁcation on the basis of results from Table 3.
The sign of the interaction term, Ydiffij,t∗Sdiffij,t, is estimated to be nega-
tive. The sign of the investment cost variable Invcj,t is as could be expected.
That is, FDI decreases as the investment cost in the host country increases. The
variable Tcj,t has a negative coeﬃcient, however the test is inconclusive since the
coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant. However, in the CMM paper, the substitutional eﬀects
25An analogous case where the data mainly reﬂect variations in the host country’s GDP can be
found in a paper by Markusen and Maskus (1999). In that case the source of data is outward
FDI from the US.
26See Figure 2 in the CMM (2001) paper.
27More speciﬁcally, the relationship between FDI and skill diﬀerences is shown in the ﬁrst graph,
identiﬁed as CMM (2001) in Figures 3 and 4 in Section 10.
21b e t w e e nt r a d ea n dF D Is e e mt oo u t w e i g ht h ec o m p l e m e n t a r ye ﬀects, indicating a
predominance of horizontal FDI, since the Tcj,t variable has a positive rather than
a negative sign. The term Tcj,t∗Sdiff2
ij,t, which captures the interaction between
skill diﬀerence and trade costs, has a negative sign, indicating FDI to be vertical
rather than horizontal. On the contrary the trade cost coeﬃcient in the source
country Tci,t, is positive, implying that higher trade barriers in the source country.
Finally, the distance variable, Disij, is estimated to have signiﬁcantly negative im-
pacts on FDI, as could be expected. This means that FDI decreases as distance
increases. More speciﬁcally, the marginal relationship can be described such that
ap o s i t i v em a r g i n a lc h a n g e( i nt h em e a nv alue) of distance would have negative
marginal eﬀects on foreign direct investment.
4.1.1 Interpretation of Coeﬃcient Estimates
When determining the interpretation of the coeﬃcient signs and magnitude of indi-
vidual variables, it is possible to explain the relationship by looking at the graphical
relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables.
Sketch 1









Let us start by looking at the relationship between Fdiij,t and Sdiffij,t as de-
scribed in Sketch 1. In Sketch 1, three possible scenarios of the relationship between
Fdiij,t and Sdiffij,t is exhibited. These are the following:
22Ydiffij,t Tcj,t Model Specification
Case 1 1 100 62.421 + 90.167Sdiffij,t − 4,575.8Sdiff
2
ij,t (2)
Case 2 0 50 62.421 + 61.994Sdiffij,t − 2,287.9Sdiff
2
ij,t (3)
Case 3 0 0 62.421 + 61.994Sdiffij,t (4)28
In Sketch 1, Case 1 is represented by the pointed line,C a s e2w i t hathin line,
a n dt h eC a s e3w i t hagray thick line.
The results shown in Sketch 1 are in line with the results of the BDH empirical
speciﬁcation, that support the horizontal model. That is, FDI is the highest when
skill diﬀerences are close to zero. This is in line with the model on horizontal FDI,
in that it predicts that FDI is the highest when skill diﬀerences (Sdiffij,t)a r ec l o s e
to zero, trade costs (Tcj,t) are low, and the source and host countries are similar
in size (Ydiffij,t is close to zero).
Another way of interpreting the estimation results is to explain the marginal
eﬀects of change in the Ydiffij,t variable as the following:
∂FDIij,t
∂SDIFFij,t =6 1 .99 + 28.17Ydiffij,t +2 ( −45.76)Tcj,t =6 1 .99 + 28.17Ydiffij,t −
91.52Tcj,t (5)
When the mean value for the Ydiffij,t variable (USD 0.96 trillion29)i si n s e r t e d
into Equation (5), and Tcj,t =0, FDI gets a value of USD 89.04 million. However,
if Ydiffij,t increases to USD 1 trillion, FDI gets a value of USD 90.17 million.
Now let us look at how the coeﬃcients of the ﬁrst two variables in Table 3 can
be interpreted. Since most of the source countries are far larger than the host
country (Iceland), much of the variation in Ydiffij,t is due to variation in the size
of the source country (i). Therefore, the asymtotic relationship between the two
variables (Ysumij,t and Ydiff2
ij,t)a n dFdiij,t can be shown in the equations below,
and exhibited in Sketch 2.
28The trade cost variable Tci,t takes the lowest value of zero, since it is an index running from
0 to 100. Moreover, the Ydiffij,t variable is represented with the lowest value of zero, because it
is not so realistic to talk of a negative value, since it would only take a negative value if the GDP
of Iceland was bigger than the GDP of other countries, wich is rarely the case.
29As shown in Table 3, in Section 3.
23Sketch 2









Sketch 2 exhibits three possible scenarios of the relationship between Fdiij,t and
GDP of the source country (Yi,t). These are the following:
Sdiffij,t Model Specification
Case 1 1 62.421 − 20.426Ydiffij,t +3 .193Ydiff
2
ij,t (6)
Case 2 0 62.421 + 7.747Ydiffij,t +3 .193Ydiff
2
ij,t (7)
Case 3 -1 62.421 − 48.599Ydiffij,t +3 .193Ydiff
2
ij,t (8)
In Sketch 2, Case 1 is represented by the pointed line,C a s e2w i t hathin line,
a n dt h eC a s e3w i t hagray thick line. However, when the marginal relationship
between the Ydiffij,t variable and is looked at more speciﬁcally, the eﬀects of
marginal change in Ydiffij,t on Fdiij,t can be represented in the following way:
∂FDIij,t
∂YDIFFij,t =6 .39Ydiffij,t
30 +2 8 .17Sdiffij,t.
So, for example when the mean value of the Ydiffij,t variable (USD 0.96 trillion)
is inserted into the equation and skill diﬀerences (Sdiffij,t) are equal to zero, then
FDI has a value of USD 6.13 million. However, if Ydiffij,t has a value of USD 1
trillion, FDI has a value of USD 6.39 million.
Overall, the estimates obtained in Table 3 indicate that, for other than the
market size measures and distance, the speciﬁcation does not perform very well.
Nevertheless, it is possible that some restrictions on the speciﬁcation perform better
than the initial one. Therefore, the next section continues by estimating some
restrictions of the initial empirical speciﬁcation.
30Since 2 ∗ 3.193Ydiffij,t =6 .386Ydiffij,t.
244.2 Speciﬁcation Restrictions
Since the signs for some of the coeﬃcients in Table 3 turned out to be diﬀerent
from what was anticipated, we now analyze whether restricting the model by elim-
inating the ﬁrst two potentially correlated variables from the model has an eﬀect
on estimates for the remaining variables.
T a b l e4 . S o m eS p e c i ﬁcation Restrictions



























































Observations 78 78 78
R-squared 0.32 0.30 0.30
Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below the regression coeﬃcients. ***, **
and * denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The regression is split up to ﬁnd out whether it alters the estimation results for
the ﬁrst two variables. The regression results for the basic CMM empirical speci-
ﬁcation are shown in column (a). Two restricted versions of the speciﬁcation are
introduced in columns (b) and (c), where the size variables are omitted separately
25in order to analyze whether some restricted speciﬁcations provide better estimates
than the basic speciﬁcation.
Omitting Ysumij,t in column (b) leads to a sign change and insigniﬁcance of
the second variable, Ydiff2
ij,t. Moreover, when the Ydiff2
ij,t variable is omitted
in column (c), the sum variable Ysumij,t also loses signiﬁcance. In both cases the
Sdiffij,t skill diﬀerence variable changes sign but remains insigniﬁcant. Finally,
t h ev a r i a b l eo m i s s i o na ﬀects the interaction term Ydiffij,t∗Sdiffij,t such that it
becomes signiﬁcant and positive. A possible reason for that could be that size
diﬀerence matters only in interaction with skill diﬀerences. A potential reason for
why only few of the variable terms are estimated to be signiﬁcant could be because
the error terms of the regression are not a perfectly normal distribution.31 As
mentioned earlier in Section 2.3, in the variables of Equation (1) it holds that E[εij,t |
xij,t]=0 . These are the typical assumptions for OLS to give consistent estimates.
Furthermore, the application of robust t statistics corrects for heterogeneity in the
sample by estimating correct standard errors. Potential non-normality of errors is
a severe diﬃculty. However, since the goal of this paper is to show how the CMM
model ﬁts Icelandic data (which is a poor ﬁt of best) rather than develop precise
estimates for inference, I will ignore this issue in line with the rest of the literature.
It appears that the ﬁrst speciﬁcation represented in column (a) is the most
preferred, because when either of the ﬁrst two variables are dropped in columns (b)
and (c), the remaining variables lose signiﬁcance. Moreover, the higher R squared
value for the ﬁrst equation also indicates that the ﬁrst regression has a better ﬁtt o
the data than the other two.
Overall, estimating a restricted form of the speciﬁcation indicates that when
either of the two ﬁrst variables in the regression (Ysumij,t or Ydiff2
ij,t)a r el e f to u t ,
the interaction term (Ydiffij,t∗Sdiffij,t) seems to be picking up the variation in
the data. Otherwise the results do not seem to shed further light on the results
obtained earlier. We will therefore continue by testing some alternatives of the
31The distribution of the error terms is exhibited in Figure 3 and 4 in Appendix A, Section 10.
26CMM speciﬁcation.32
32The original CMM empirical speciﬁcaiton may not be the best suitable one for this set of
data.
275 Outliers Omitted
As Figure 5 in Appendix B exhibits, it appears that the long right tail of the
distribution could be due to the existence of very few very large outliers in the
sample. This could also be the reason why the distribution of the error terms in
Figure 5 has a longer tail to the right. The existence of large outliers could be
because some of the source countries of investment are considerably larger than
others.33
T a b l e5 . S a m p l eE s t i m a t e db yG D PS i z e .































































Observations 78 15 63
R-squared 0.32 0.97 0.21
Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below the regression coeﬃcients. ***, **
and * denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
To correct for this potential eﬀects of outliers, the data is now divided into two
subsamples based on economic size. The second column represents estimates based
33Source countries of FDI are listed in Section 2.
28on FDI made by the three biggest source countries only. These countries are the
US, Japan, and Germany, respectively.34 The third column represents estimates for
the remaining 20 countries. Overall, the results for the two subsamples presented in
Table 5 indicate that economic size does not alter the preceding results. Thus the
results from dividing the sample into two subsamples further supports the results
obtained earlier.
34In 1999, the GDP of the US and Japan, was substantially higher than the GDP of the third
largest country, Germany. GDP in the US was 3.30 times higher than that of Germany, and
Japan’s GDP was 2.06 times that of Germany.
296 The Number of Observations Increased
In Table 6, the results are introduced from increasing the sample size by using
diﬀerent proxies for trade and investment costss. The results from enlarging the
sample by almost half are shown in Table 6.
Table 6. Diﬀerent Proxies for Trade Cost and Investment Cost















































































Observations 78 150 150 150
R-squared 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.30
Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below the regression coeﬃcients. ***, **
and * denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
30In order to see whether increasing the number of observations will possibly
aﬀect the previous results, we now analyze an enlarged sample. The number of
observations is increased by adding dummies for trade or investment costs, and by
inserting a time trend.
Column (b) represents the inclusion of host investment costs, where Invcj,t is
replaced by an adjusted investment cost variable, Invc0
j,t, together with a dummy
variable,35 Dummy_Invc0
j,t. The number of observations has increased from 78 to
150, i.e. they almost double. The Dummy_Invc0
j,t takes a value of zero in 1989-
1994, but the sample value otherwise.36 Also in column (c), the trade variable
is replaced by Tc0
j,t together with a dummy variable, Dummy_Tc0
j,t. Finally in
column (d), both investment and trade costs are replaced with a linear time trend37.
The approaches applied in columns (a) through (d) are meant to show the eﬀects
of enlarged sample size on the size and skill variables. The estimates obtained for
the dummies and the time trend are not interpreted speciﬁcally, since they are not
important for the overall regression results.38
The results are similar for all three regressions. The ﬁrst two size variables
continue to have the same signs as the basic regression. However, the skill la-
bor variable, Sdiffij,t, is estimated to be negative and signiﬁcant in columns (b)
through (d). In summary, application of dummies or a time trend39 backs up
previous results except in the case of the skill diﬀerence variable. The negative
sign of the skill diﬀerence variable can be interpreted such that FDI is decreasing
in positive skill diﬀerences, and thereby increasing in negative skill diﬀerences. In
other words, when skills are measured by occupational categories of the labor force,
FDI is estimated to increase as the host country (Iceland) becomes more skilled
compared to the source country. Multinationals with headquarters in the source
35An explanation of the dummy approach can be found in Greene (1997, pp. 431).
36The dummy Dummy_Invc0
j,t takes a zero value in 1989-1994, for the years when data on
investment cost could not be obtained from the World Competitiveness Report.
37The time trend runs from 1 to 11 to cover all years included in the sample.
38One additional regression was also run, including Tc0
j,t , Invc0
j,t and a dummy. However,
this regression yielded results analogous to those in columns (b) and (c).
39An example of a time trend can be found in Heckman and Walker (1990). Another recent
paper on FDI using a time trend is Braunstein and Epstein (2002, pp. 16, 20).
31country can thereby be said to be attracted to more skilled labor when choosing
Iceland as a host country.
327 Application of the Davies (2002) Speciﬁcation
In a recent paper, BDH (2002) ﬁnd evidence indicating that the model on horizontal
MNEs presented by Markusen (1984) cannot be rejected in favor of the KK model.
They base their results on ﬁndings that indicate that FDI is increasing in negative
skill diﬀerences, but decreasing in positive skill diﬀerences. However, in a more
recent paper, Davies (2002) ﬁnds it possible to reject the horizontal model in favor
of the KK model. The model presented here by Davies will be referred to as “The
Augmented KK model” and applied as a ﬁnal speciﬁcation tested.
In summary, all variations of the skill labor abundance variable in Part A are
estimated to be positive although insigniﬁcant in most cases. This indicates that
in our case, FDI is estimated to be increasing in skill diﬀerences. The regression
part referred to as PART A in Table 7.
When squared skill diﬀerences are added to the regression in column two, the
regression is estimated to be positively signiﬁcant, providing some support for the
model on horizontal MNEs by Markusen. However, adding a cubed term to the
regression in column three suggests a rejection of the horizontal model in favor of
the KK model. The positive signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the cubed term indicates that
the horizontal model can be rejected in favor of the KK model.
33Table 7. Davies Empirical Speciﬁcation of the KK model.

































































































































Obs. 78 78 78 39 39
R-Sq. 0.32 0.34 0.38 0.59 0.74
Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below the regression coeﬃcients. ***, **
and * denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
34Another way of determining between horizontal and vertical FDI is to estimate
the KK model based on subsamples. This is done in Table 7, Part B. The ﬁrst
subsample includes observations when the skill diﬀerence is positive, and the second
subsample includes negative skill diﬀerences. Analogous subsample division was
used by BDH (2002), and Davies (2002). Observations are separated into those with
positive skill diﬀerences and those with negative skill diﬀerences. They obtained the
coeﬃcient estimates for skill diﬀerences to be positive for the negative subsample,
b u tn e g a t i v ef o rt h ep o s i t i v es u b s a m p l e . A si nD a v i e s ,Iﬁnd that splitting the
sample signﬁcantly raises my R squared. Furthermore, the positive skill diﬀerence
tends to show greater signiﬁcance for source trade costs. However, unlike Davies,
my skill estimates still cannot reject the horizontal model.
It is possible that these results may be explained by a small variation in Sdiffij,t,
since it runs only from -0.08 to 0.14. In comparison, the Sdiffij,t variable runs
w i t h i nam u c hw i d e rr a n g ei nt h eC M Mp a p e r ,r u n n i n gf r o m- 0 . 2 7 7t o0 . 2 7 7 . A
potential reason for limited variation in skill diﬀerences in this paper could be due to
a low number of observations. This gives an indication on how important variation
is and how serious the lack of data can be for small countries.
358 Replacing the Proxy for Skilled Labor
We now turn to an alternative proxy for skilled labor over the same period to
analyze if it alters previous results. Hence, the CMM speciﬁcation of the KK
model is now estimated after replacing the proxy for skilled labor with two diﬀerent
variables. First I replace the skilled labor proxy with per capita GDP, and then
I use secondary school education as a new proxy for skilled labor. I begin by
analyzing the eﬀects of including per capita GDP. For clariﬁcation, the summary
statistics for per capita GDP40 a r es h o w ni nT a b l e8 . 41
Table 8. Summary Statistics for the New Variables
Variable Units Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
YPCdiffij,t USD 240 -2,860.91 11,635.93 -28,487.45 21,976.91
Ydiffij,t∗YPCdiffij,t 240 2,354.48 15,489.56 -12,608.37 84,004.77
Tcj,t∗YPCdiff2
ij,t USD 110 7.50e+09 1.05e+10 405,288.30 3.55e+10
g Sdiffij,t % gross 192 1.71 18.80 -35.56 50.69
Ydiffij,t∗ g Sdiffij,t 191 -2.13 18.89 -122.84 55.41
Tcj,t∗ g Sdiff
2
ij,t % gross 82 21,362.20 26,832.2 0.38 112,547.50
Source: Authors Computations.
The ﬁrst new variable YPCdiffij,t presented in Table 8 measures the per capita
GDP42 diﬀerence between countries. The per capita GDP diﬀerence variable is
deﬁned as the following: YPCdiffij,t ≡ GDPi,t/Ni,t − GDPj,t/Nj,t,w h e r eG D P
is measured in trillions of dollars. The regression results obtained for this new
variable are presented in PART A in Table 9. This new variable is somewhat
similar to a variable used by Brainard (1997). Brainard used per worker GDP43,
40The summary statistics for the YPCdiffij,t refer to sample estimates for the ”Enlarged
Sample” as referred to in Part A in Table 9.
41As a comparison to the variable deﬁnition in Table 2.
42Another example of a similar proxy is the one used by Slaughter (2000, pp. 461). He proxies
skilled labor with what he refers to as the share of the nonproducation wages bill when divided
by the total wage bill of production and nonproduction workers.
43Brainard (1997) included a per worker income diﬀerential to control for diﬀerences in factor
proportions.
36but I prefer to use per capita GDP in order to reﬂect the relative diﬀerences in
wealth of countries.
The second new variable measures the educational44 diﬀerence of the source
and the host country. This is a new proxy for skilled labor, valuing skills based
on secondary school enrollment.45 T h i sv a r i a b l eh a sb e e nw i d e l yu s e di ng r o w t h
literature, an example that can be seen in Economic Growth46 by Barro and Sala-
I-Martin (1998). In order to stress the change in the proxy for skilled labor, it is
denoted with tilda, as g Sdiffij,t in Table 8 and Table 9.
To simplify the comparison between the two new variables, the ﬁrst regression
results presented in PART A in Table 9 (same sample) are based on the same
sample size as the basic CMM regression presented previously in Table 3. However,
estimates shown in the second column in PART A are obtained from an enlarged
sample based on an increased number of observations for the new variable. The
regression results for both columns in PART A indicate that replacing the original
skill diﬀerences variable with per capita GDP backs up the results obtained for
t h es i z ea n ds k i l ld i ﬀerences in the basic regression in Table 3. In other words,
the results in PART A indicate that source countries make more foreign direct
investment as they become richer relative to Iceland.
Moreover, the regression results presented in PART B provide analogous results
for size eﬀects and skill diﬀerences, although the proxy for skill diﬀerences is esti-
mated to be insigniﬁcant. This can be interpreted such that the level of FDI is not
aﬀected by a relative increase in education in the source country, compared to the
host country. Put another way, it does not seem to aﬀect investment incentives
how well educated the domestic labor is compared to the labor in the source coun-
44”Education improves the labor force and thus enables workers to use existing capital more
eﬃciently” (Gylfason, 2002).
45The World Bank deﬁnes the serie for secondary scholl enrollment, or School enrollment, sec-
ondary (% gross) in the following way: “Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment,
regardless of age, to the population of the age group that oﬃcially corresponds to the level of ed-
ucation shown. Secondary education completes the provision of basic education that began at the
primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human development,
by oﬀering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction using more specialized teachers.”
46Chapter 12.
37tries of investment, although a positive coeﬃcient indicates that it might increase
as source country labor is better educated. Also, distance looses signiﬁcance under
these circumstances.
Together, the results in PART A and PART B therefore back up the results
obtained for the basic model speciﬁcation presented in Table 3.
38Table 9. Replacing Proxy for Skill Labor Abundance
Part A Part B
YPCdiffij,t ≡ Yi,t/Ni,t − Yj,t/Nj,t g Sdiffij,t ≡ Ei,t − Ej,t

































































Observations 78 100 74
R-squared 0.74 0.49 0.26
Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below the regression coeﬃcients. ***, **
and * denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
399C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper oﬀers a reﬁnement and explores a resolution of the Knowledge Capital
model for small countries like Iceland, since better understanding the desire of multi-
nationals when making foreign direct investments in small countries is economically
meaningful.
The main conclusion is that when the empirical speciﬁcation presented by Carr,
Markusen, and Maskus (2001) is applied to Iceland, the estimates obtained diﬀer
from the general case. The overall results indicate that the driving forces behind
foreign direct investment in small countries like Iceland appear to be diﬀerent from
the forces driving FDI in larger economies or that the CMM speciﬁcation encoun-
ters data diﬃculties when GDP’s are highly mismatched. More speciﬁcally, the size
eﬀects appear to be reverse, indicating that investment incentives decrease with dis-
similarity in size, and that FDI is likely to increase as the source countries decrease
in size. An important result is that I obtain mixed evidence for the role of skilled
labor, although in most cases investment is estimated to increase as the source
country becomes more skilled than the host country. More speciﬁcally, estimates
indicate that when skill is measured by occupational categories, FDI increases as the
source country becomes more skilled in comparison to the host country (Iceland).
Consequently, multinationals will be attracted by less skilled labor when choosing
Iceland as a host country, or that multinationals tend to come from highly skilled
countries. Secondly, when skills are measured as secondary school education,r a t h e r
than by occupational categories like before, more education in the source countries
is estimated to have positive, however insigniﬁcant impact on FDI. That is, it does
not seem to aﬀect investment incentives how well educated source country labor
is compared to host country labor. Taken together the these two diﬀerent skill
measures indicate somewhat conﬂicting eﬀects of skills on FDI, and therefore the
research continues by investigating whether source country ﬁrms seek host countries
with skilled labor or unskilled labor, when measured by its cost, i.e. expensive or
cheap labor. The third skillness proxy applied, is measured as per capita GDP,
40estimates indicate that an increase in skill diﬀerences increases FDI. Therefore,
more foreign direct investment is made by source countries that are rich relative to
Iceland.
A potential explanation for the results obtained for Iceland is that foreign direct
investment is driven largely by one dominating industry, the power intensive indus-
t r y . T od i gd e e p e ri n t ot h i st o p i c ,f u r t h er research into the forces behind sector
speciﬁc FDI in Iceland may prove quite insightful.
4110 Appendix A The Edgeworth Box


















Source: International Labor Organization (ILO).
Figures 3 and 4 exhibit source country weighted skill labor (vertical-axis) and
weighted unskilled labor (horizontal-axis) as in Barconier et al. (2002). These
are derived as in the Figure 2 Edgeworth Box. Skilled labor is calculated as
SKij =( Si∗Ni)/(Si∗Ni+Sj∗Nj)+j ∗Nj)si =( Si∗Ni)/(Si∗Ni+Sj∗Nj)
and unskilled labor as UNSKij =( Ui∗ Ni)/(Ui∗ Ni+ Uj∗ Nj).I n F i g u r e 3 a l l
observations are in the upper right corner of the box, i.e. the northeast corner.
4211 Appendix B Distribution of Residuals
Figure 5: Distribution of Residuals in Table 4, Fraction (% of 100).
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